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in other regions. We estimate an equilibrium search model to iden-
tify the policy-relevant treatment effect. A large-scale rollout of the
program is shown to decrease welfare, while a standard partial micro-
econometric cost-benefit analysis concludes the opposite.
I. Introduction
We estimate the labor market effects of a Danish activation program for
unemployed workers, taking into account general equilibrium effects. The
program starts quickly after a worker enters unemployment, and the goal is
to provide intensive guidance toward finding work. To empirically evaluate
the effectiveness of the activation program, a randomized experiment was
set up in two Danish counties. Graversen and van Ours (2008), Rosholm
(2008), and Vikström, Rosholm, and Svarer (2013) show that participants
in the program findwork faster than nonparticipants and that the difference
is substantial. To investigate the presence of congestion and general equilib-
rium effects, we compare job-finding rates of nonparticipants in the exper-
iment counties with those of unemployed workers in comparison counties
(using the same administrative data). Since the experiment countieswere not
selected randomly, we use preexperimental data from all counties to con-
trol, in a difference-in-differences setting, for existing differences between
counties. This allows us to estimate treatment effects on the nontreated
workers. We find that the job-finding rate is lower for nonparticipants dur-
ing the experiment than for unemployed in the comparison counties.
We focus on how the experiment affects vacancy supply, wages, and
working hours. We find some marginally statistically significant evidence
that the supply of vacancies increases faster in the experiment regions, but
the post-unemployment job quality is unaffected. Next, we develop an
equilibrium search model that incorporates the activation program and al-
lows for both vacancy supply responses and positive or negative congestion
effects. We use the results from the empirical analysis to estimate the pa-
rameters of the equilibrium search model, using indirect inference. The esti-
mated equilibrium search model allows us to study the effects of a large-scale
rollout of the activation program and compute the effects on labor market
behavior and outcomes. Our main finding is that a large-scale rollout de-
creases welfare. The model that fits the data best has a matching function
that allows for strong congestion effects (if the average search intensity in-
creases, the aggregate matching rate can even decrease) and has Nash wage
bargaining. In this model, aggregate unemployment increases slightly (half a
percentage point) in case of a large-scale rollout. The main findings are ro-
bust to different specifications of wage mechanism and matching function.
A large number of papers stress the importance of dealing with selective
participation when evaluating the effectiveness of employment programs
for disadvantaged workers. In particular, LaLonde (1986) demonstrates the
difficulty of reproducing results from randomized experiments with non-This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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experimental methods. Since then, the use of randomized experiments has be-
come increasingly popular when evaluating active labor market programs;
see, for example, Johnson and Klepinger (1994), Meyer (1995), Dolton and
O’Neill (1996), Gorter and Kalb (1996), Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Des-
chênes (2005), Card and Hyslop (2005), van den Berg and van der Klaauw
(2006), and Graversen and van Ours (2008). The evaluation of active labor
market programs is typically based on comparing the outcomes of partici-
pants with those of nonparticipants. This is the case not only in experimental
evaluations but also in nonexperimental evaluations (after correction for se-
lection). It implies that equilibrium effects are assumed to be absent (e.g.,
DiNardo and Lee 2011).
In the case of active labor market programs, equilibrium effects are likely
to be important (e.g., Abbring andHeckman 2007). The goal of an empirical
evaluation is to collect information that facilitates a decision on whether or
not a program should be implemented on a large scale. If equilibrium effects
exist, changing the treatment intensity affects the labor market outcomes of
both participants and nonparticipants. As a result, the findings from an em-
pirical evaluation inwhich outcomes of participants and nonparticipants are
compared will depend on the observed treatment intensity. Cahuc and Le
Barbanchon (2010) show, within a theoretical equilibrium search model,
that neglecting equilibrium effects can lead to wrong conclusions regarding
the effectiveness of the program. A recent empirical literature shows the
presence of spillover effects of various labor market programs (e.g., Blun-
dell et al. 2004; Lise, Seitz, and Smith 2004; Albrecht, van den Berg, and
Vroman 2009; Crépon et al. 2013; Ferracci, Jolivet, and van den Berg 2014;
Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller 2015).
Our paper contributes not only to the empirical treatment-evaluation lit-
erature but also to the macro (search) literature. We demonstrate how data
from a randomized experiment, combined with nonexperimental data, can
be used as auxiliary moments to estimate congestion effects in the matching
process and how vacancy supply responds to an increase in search intensity
in a macro searchmodel.We exploit the fact that, because of the experimen-
tal design, the increase in search intensity of participants in the activation
program is truly exogenous. This makes the identification of the structural
parameters more convincing than in typical calibration exercises. Our re-
sults suggest that in settings where search intensity matters, the urn-ball
matching function with multiple applications performs better than a Cobb-
Douglas matching function. Our approach of combining data from a ran-
domized experiment with a structural model relates to Lise, Seitz, and Smith
(2015), who use the exogenous variation from a randomized experiment to
validate a structuralmodel for evaluating an employment program inCanada.
A similar approach is applied for evaluating PROGRESA (Mexico’s Pro-
grama de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación) by Attanasio, Meghir, and San-
tiago (2012) and Todd and Wolpin (2006).This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1076 Gautier et al.
A
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the background of the Danish randomized experiment as well as literature
on treatment externalities. Section III provides a description of the data, and
Section IV presents the empirical analysis and the estimation results. In Sec-
tion V, we develop an equilibrium search model that incorporates the acti-
vation program. Estimation of the model and policy simulations are pre-
sented in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. Background
A. The Danish Experiment
In this subsection, we provide some details about the activation program
for unemployed workers. We discuss the randomized experiment used to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program and review earlier evaluations of
this experiment. More details on the institutional background can be found
in Graversen and van Ours (2008) and Rosholm (2008).
The goal of the activation program is to provide intensive guidance to-
ward finding work. The relevant population consists of newly unemployed
workers. After approximately 1.5 weeks of unemployment, those selected
for the program receive a letter explaining the content of the program. The
program consists of three parts. First, after 5–6 weeks of unemployment,
workers have to participate in a 2-week job search assistance program, fol-
lowed by weekly or biweekly meetings with a caseworker. During these
meetings a job search plan is developed, search effort is monitored, and suit-
able vacancies are provided. Finally, if after 4 months the worker has not
found work, a new program starts for at least 3 months. At this stage the
caseworker has some discretion in choosing the appropriate program, which
can either be more job search assistance, a temporary subsidized job in either
the private sector or the public sector, classroom training, or vocational train-
ing. The total costs of the program are 2,122 DKK (Danish kroner; about
€285, US$355), on average, per entitled worker.1
To evaluate the effectiveness of the activation policy, a randomized ex-
periment was conducted in two Danish counties, Storstrøm and South Jut-
land (see fig. 1). Both counties are characterized by a small public sector rel-
ative to other Danish counties. The key economic sectors are industry,
agriculture, and, to some extent, transportation. All individuals who started
collecting unemployment benefits between November 2005 and February
2006 participated in the experiment. Individuals born on the first to the fif-
teenth of the month participated in the activation program, while individu-
als born on the sixteenth to the thirty-first did not receive this treatment.
The control group received the usual assistance, consisting of meetings with1 These costs are in addition to the costs of the usual assistance offered to unem-
ployed workers in Denmark.
This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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a caseworker every 3 months and more intensive assistance after 1 year of
unemployment.
At the time of the experiment,Denmark consisted of 15 counties andhad a
population of about 5.5million. Storstrøm and South Jutland each had about
250,000 inhabitants, and both counties volunteered to run the experiment.
The unemployment rate in Denmark was about 4.2%.Unemployment ben-
efits are relatively high, with an average of about 14,800 DKK per month
(€1,987) and an average replacement rate of between 65% and 70%. It is of-
ten argued that the success of Danish active labor market programs explains
the low unemployment rate (e.g., Rosholm 2008). The median unemploy-
ment duration at the time of the experiment was about 13 weeks.
Graversen and vanOurs (2008) use durationmodels to estimate the effect
of the activation program on exit rates to work. They find large positive ef-
fects. The program increases the reemployment rate by about 30%, and this
effect is constant across age and gender. Rosholm (2008)finds similar resultsFIG. 1.—Location of the experiment counties: South Jutland (left) and Storstrøm
(right).This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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when estimating the effects of the activation program separately for both
counties. Graversen and van Ours (2008), Rosholm (2008), and Vikström,
Rosholm, and Svarer (2013) all investigate which elements of the activation
program are most effective and report a substantial threat effect as well as a
positive effect of the job search assistance. Additional evidence for threat ef-
fects is provided by Graversen and vanOurs (2011). They show that the ef-
fect of the activation program is largest for individuals with the longest
travel time to the program location. The finding that activation programs
can have substantial threat effects is in agreement with Black et al. (2003).
All studies on the effect of the activation program ignore potential spill-
over effects between participants and nonparticipants. Graversen and van
Ours (2008) argue that spillover effects should be small because the fraction
of the participants in the total population of unemployed workers never ex-
ceeds 8%.However, we estimate that within an experiment county the frac-
tion of participants in the stock of unemployed workers is much larger to-
ward the end of the experiment period. Consider the following simple
approximation. Around 5% of all unemployed workers find work each
week, implying that if the labor market is in steady state, after four months
about 25% of the stock of unemployed workers are participants. If we take
into account that the outflow of long-term unemployed workers is consid-
erably lower than the outflow of short-term unemployed workers (which
implies that competition for jobs occurs mostly between short-term unem-
ployedworkers), the treatment intensity will be close to 30%of the stock of
unemployed workers. Spillover effects seem plausible for such a treatment
share.
B. Treatment Externalities
In this subsection, we briefly illustrate the definition of treatment effects
in the presence of treatment externalities and discuss some recent empirical
literature dealing with treatment externalities. We mainly focus on labor
market applications but also address empirical studies in other fields.
Consider a population in which a fraction t participates in a treatment. In
this setting, the average effect of participating in the treatment is defined as
D tð Þ 5 E Y*1 jt
 
2 E Y*0 jt
 
,
where Y*0 and Y*1 denote the potential outcomes without and with treat-
ment, respectively. A common assumption in the treatment-evaluation lit-
erature is that an individual’s behavior and outcomes do not directly affect
the behavior and outcomes of other individuals (e.g., DiNardo and Lee
2011). This assumption is formalized in the stable unit treatment value as-
sumption (SUTVA), which states that the potential outcomes of each indi-
vidual are independent of the treatment status of other individuals in the
population (Cox 1958; Rubin 1978). We write this assumption asThis content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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If SUTVA holds, then the treatment effect is no longer dependent on the
treatment status of other individuals. Therefore, the average treatment effect
does not depend on the treatment participation rate t, and we canwriteD 5
DðtÞ for all values of t. In that case, when data from a randomized experi-
ment are available, such as from theDanish experiment discussed in the pre-
vious subsection, the difference-in-means estimator provides an estimate
for the average treatment effect in the (treated) population.
However, if SUTVA is violated, the results from a randomized experi-
ment are of limited policy relevance. This is, for example, the case when
the ultimate goal is a large-scale rollout of a program (e.g., Heckman and
Vytlacil 2005; DiNardo and Lee 2011). Then the fraction of the population
in the same area receiving treatment is relevant. In the case of the Danish ac-
tivation program, the county is taken as the relevant area and assumed to act
as the local labor market. See, for a justification of this assumption, van den
Berg and van Vuuren (2010), who discuss local labor markets in Denmark.
Also, Deding and Filges (2003) report low geographical mobility in Den-
mark. When the ultimate goal is the large-scale rollout of a treatment, the
policy-relevant treatment effect is
D* 5 E Y*1 jt 5 1
 
2 E Y*0 jt 5 0
 
: (1)
Identification of this treatment effect requires observing local labor markets
in which all unemployed workers participate in the program as well as local
labor markets in which no individuals participate. A randomized experi-
ment within a single local labor market does not provide the required var-
iation in the treatment intensity t.
SUTVAmight be violated in the case of activation programs for a number
of reasons. First, if participants search more intensively, this can reduce the
job-finding rates of nonparticipants competing for the same jobs. Second,
the activation program may affect reservation wages of the participants
and thereby wages. Third, when unemployed workers devote more effort
to job search, a specific vacancy is more likely to be filled. Firms can respond
by openingmore vacancies. These equilibrium effects affect not only the non-
participants but also the other participants in the program. In Section V,
we provide a formal discussion of potential equilibrium effects due to the
activation program.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the randomized experiment to
evaluate the activation program was conducted in two Danish counties.
The experiment provides an estimate of Dðt̂Þ, where t̂ is the observed frac-
tion of unemployed job seekers participating in the activation program. In
addition, we compare the outcomes of the nonparticipants to outcomes of
unemployed workers in other counties. This should provide an estimate forThis content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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E½Y*0 jt 5 t̂ 2 E½Y*0 jt 5 0, that is, the treatment effect on the nontreated
workers. To deal with structural differences between counties, we use out-
comes in all counties before the experiment and make a common-trend
assumption. In Section IV, we provide more details about the empirical
analysis. Still, the empirical approach identifies only treatment effects and
equilibrium effects at a treatment intensity t̂, while for a large-scale rollout
of the program one should focus on t 5 1. Therefore, in Section V we de-
velop an equilibrium search model, which we estimate using the estimated
treatment effects. This model is used to investigate the case in which all un-
employed workers participate (t 5 1) and to obtain an estimate for the
policy-relevant treatment effect defined in equation (1).
Treatment externalities have recently received increasing attention in the
empirical literature. Blundell et al. (2004) evaluate the impact of an active la-
bormarket program (consisting of job search assistance andwage subsidies)
targeted at young unemployed workers. Identification is based on differ-
ences in timing of the implementation between regions, as well as on age re-
quirements. The empirical results are inconclusive with regard to equilib-
rium effects. However, after using a more structural approach, Blundell,
Costa Dias, and Meghir (2003) show that treatment effects can change sign
when equilibrium effects are taken into account. Also, Ferracci, Jolivet, and
van den Berg (2014) find strong evidence for the presence of equilibrium ef-
fects of a French training program for unemployedworkers. In their empir-
ical analysis, they follow a two-step approach. In a first step, they estimate a
treatment effect within each local labor market. In a second step, the esti-
mated treatment effects are related to the fraction of treated workers in
the local labor market. Because of the nonexperimental nature of their data,
in both steps they rely on a conditional independence assumption to iden-
tify treatment effects. Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) specify amatchingmodel
to quantify equilibrium effects of a wage subsidy program. Using experi-
mental data, the model is calibrated to the control group and is found to
be able to predict treatment group outcomes well. The results show that
equilibrium effects are substantial and may even reverse the cost-benefit
conclusion made on the basis of a partial equilibrium analysis.
Crépon et al. (2013) perform a randomized experiment to identify equi-
librium effects of a counseling program in France. In addition to random-
ized program participation, the share of participants across regions is also
randomized. The target population consists of highly educated unemployed
workers below age 30 who had been unemployed for at least 6 months. The
program affects treated workers positively, while a small negative (and statis-
tically insignificant) effect on nontreated workers is found. The small spill-
over effects can be due to the fact that the treated workers constitute only a
small fraction of the total stock of unemployedworkers. The fraction is small
partly because of the specific target group and partly because participationThis content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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(conditional on assignment to treatment) is voluntary and refusal rates are
high.
Treatment externalities have also received interest outside the evaluation
of active labor market programs. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) find
that the effect of the size of the tuition fee on college enrollment becomes
substantially smaller when general equilibrium effects are taken into ac-
count. Miguel and Kremer (2004) find spillover effects of deworming drugs
on schools in Kenya. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) study the effect of
tracking on schooling outcomes, allowing for several sources of externali-
ties. Moretti (2004) shows that equilibrium effects of changes in the supply
of educated workers can be substantial.
III. Data
We use two data sets. The first is an administrative data set describing un-
employment spells and subsequent earnings and hours worked. The second
is a panel data set of the stock of open vacancies by county. Below, we dis-
cuss both data sets in detail.
The experiment involves all individuals becoming unemployed between
November 2005 and February 2006 in Storstrøm and South Jutland. The
data are provided by the National Labor Market Board and include all
41,801 individuals who applied for regular benefits in the experiment period
in all Danish counties.2 We remove 1,398 individuals from the sample for
which the county of residence is inconsistent. Of the remaining 40,403 ob-
servations, 3,751 individuals live in either Storstrøm or South Jutland and
participate in the experiment. Of the participants in the experiment, 1,814
individuals are assigned to the treatment groups and 1,937 to the control
group.
The data also include individuals who started collecting benefits 1 year
before the experiment period (between November 2004 and February 2005)
and 2 years before the experimental period (between November 2003 and
February 2004). We refer to these periods as the preexperiment periods. In
the empirical analysis, we use one preexperiment period, containing those
who entered 1 year before the experimental period. This period contains
49,063 individuals.
For eachworkerwe observe theweek inwhich (s)he starts collecting ben-
efits and the duration of collecting benefits, measured inweeks.Workers are
followed for atmost 2 years after becoming unemployed. All individuals are
entitled to at least 4 years of collecting benefits. Combining the data on un-
employment durationswith data on earnings shows that almost all observed
exits in the first 2 years are to employment.2 We exclude Copenhagen, because it differs from the rest of Denmark in terms
of labor market characteristics.
This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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A. Preexperiment Trends
Our identification strategy requires the common-trend assumption, stat-
ing that in the absence of the experiment, the trends in the unemployment
duration are the same in the experiment counties and the comparison coun-
ties. Because Storstrøm and South Jutland volunteered to run the experi-
ment, we first explore whether this assumption is likely to hold by investi-
gating the preexperiment years. Figure 2 shows the average unemployment
rate in the experiment counties and the comparison counties in the 10 years
preceding the experiment. The vertical line indicates the start of the exper-
iment. Changes in unemployment over time are very similar in the two
groups, although the decrease in unemployment in 2004 is slightly larger
in the experiment counties.3
Next, we compare outflow from unemployment in the preexperiment
periods. Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor func-
tions for individuals who started collecting benefits in the preexperiment
periods (November 2003–February 2004 and November 2004–February
2005). Again, we distinguish between the experiment counties and compar-
ison counties. To correct for differences in observed characteristics, each
survivor is weighted on the basis of distribution of gender, unemployment
history, and ethnicity in the comparison counties in the 2005–6 period.
Figure 3A shows that in the 2003–4 period, the experiment counties are
very similar to the comparison counties. The median unemployment dura-
tion is 18 weeks in the experiment counties and 17 weeks in the comparison
counties. After 1 year, in both groups, 78% of the unemployed leave unem-
ployment. A log-rank test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distri-
butions of unemployment durations in the experiment and comparison
counties are the same (with a p-value of .25). The survival functions of
the experiment counties and comparison counties are also very similar in
the 2004–5 period (fig. 3B). For both groups, the median unemployment
duration is 15 weeks. Again, a log-rank test cannot reject that the unem-
ployment distributions of the two groups are the same in 2004–5 (with a
p-value of .24). The strong similarity of the survivor functions in both pre-
experiment periods suggests that, at least in terms of outflow from unem-
ployment, the comparison counties and the experiment counties face similar
trends.
B. Experimental Period
Next, we consider individuals who entered unemployment in the exper-
iment period (November 2005–February 2006). Figure 4 shows theKaplan-3 In the empirical analysis, we use one preexperimental period, which runs from
November 2004 to February 2005. During this period, the unemployment rate is
virtually identical in the experiment and comparison counties. If anything, changes
in economic conditions are slightly more favorable in the experiment counties,
leading to an underestimation of spillover effects.
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Meier estimates for the treatment and control groups in the experiment
counties and for individuals living in the comparison counties. Individuals
exposed to the activation program have a higher exit rate from unemploy-
ment than individuals assigned to the control group in the experiment coun-
ties. The Kaplan-Meier estimates show that after 12 weeks, about 50% of
the treated individuals leave unemployment, while this is 16 weeks for indi-
viduals in the control group and 14 weeks for individuals living in the com-
parison counties. Within the treatment group, 91% of the individuals leave
unemployment within a year, compared to 87% in the control group and
86% in the comparison counties. A log-rank test rejects that the distribu-
tions of unemployment durations are the same in the treatment and control
groups (p-value < .01). Such a test cannot reject that the distributions of un-
employment durations are the same in the control group and the compari-
son counties; the p-value equals .47 (but this test does not correct for county
fixed effects).
The data contain, for each individual, the annual earnings and annual
hours worked from 2003 until 2010. Combining this information with the
unemployment spells, we can compute weekly earnings for the period after
the unemployment spell. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the experi-
mental period and the preexperimental year for individuals in each of five
groups. On average, those individuals who are observed to have found work
after unemployment work about 35 hours per week, and there are no sub-
stantial differences between the experiment counties and the comparisonFIG. 2.—Preexperiment unemployment rate in experiment and comparison coun-
ties. Source: Statistics Denmark.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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c
counties. The weekly earnings are higher in the experiment period than in
the preexperiment period and higher in the comparison counties than in
the experiment counties. Participants in the activation programwork slightly
more hours and have somewhat higher earnings than individuals in the con-
trol group.FIG. 3.—Survivor functions for the experimental counties and the comparison
ounties in the years before the experiment.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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The data include a number of individual characteristics. Age and immi-
grant status distributions are roughly similar across groups. In the experi-
ment period, there is a higher fraction of males among those becoming un-
employed in the experiment counties than in the comparison counties. In
the comparison counties, the unemployed workers have a slightly longer
history of benefits receipt in the experiment period than in the preexperi-
ment period. Earnings and hours worked before the unemployment spell
are roughly similar across groups, and there are also only minor differences
in education categories.
The lower part of the table shows some county-level statistics. In both the
experiment counties and the comparison counties, the local unemployment
rate declines and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increases be-
tween the preexperiment and experiment periods. The labor force partici-
pation rate remains virtually unchanged. These changes are suggestive of
similar calendar time trends in the experiment and comparison counties.
However, in both time periods the labor market conditions are, on average,
more favorable in the comparison counties than in the experiment counties,
that is, a lower unemployment rate, higher labor force participation, and
higher GDP per capita.
Our second data set describes monthly information on the average num-
ber of open vacancies per day in all Danish counties between January 2004FIG. 4.—Survivor functions for the comparison counties, the control group, and
the treatment group during the experiment.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).





















and November 2007. These data are collected by the National Labor Mar-
ket Board on the basis of information from the local job centers. To take ac-
count of differences in sizes of the labor force between counties, we consider
the logarithm of the stock of vacancies. Figure 5 shows how the average
number of open vacancies changes over time in both the experiment coun-
ties and the comparison counties. Both lines follow the same business cycle
pattern. During the experiment period and just afterward, the increase in the
vacancy stock is somewhat larger in the experiment counties than in the
comparison counties.IV. Empirical Analysis
The previous section discusses descriptive evidence on the impact of the
activation program. In this section, we empirically investigate its effect
on exit rates from unemployment, post-unemployment earnings and hours
worked, and the stock of vacancies. The goal is not only to estimate the im-
pact of the program but also to investigate the presence of possible equilib-
rium effects.able 1
ummary Statistics
Experiment Counties Comparison Counties
2004–5 Treatment Control 2004–5 2005–6
ours worked per week 35.4 36.6 34.9 35.0 36.1
arnings (DKK per week) 5,950 6,271 6,160 6,256 6,586
ale (%) 54.6 60.8 59.2 53.0 52.4
ge (years) 42.0 42.4 42.3 41.3 41.2
ative (%) 94.8 93.2 94.4 93.7 93.0
estern immigrant (%) 3.2 4.0 3.4 2.8 3.2
onwestern immigrant (%) 2.0 2.8 2.2 3.5 3.8
enefits previous year (weeks) 10.5 9.8 9.0 10.2 11.1
enefits past 2 years (weeks) 12.7 12.3 11.9 12.5 13.8
revious hours worked per week 27.5 28.4 28.5 27.1 27.0
revious earnings (DKK per week) 4,903 5,191 5,436 4,993 5,113
ducation category (%):
No qualifying education 34.6 35.8 40.5 33.7 37.3
Vocational education 49.4 50.7 47.6 45.2 44.2
Short qualifying education 4.1 4.9 3.5 4.7 4.8
Medium-length qualifying education 9.8 5.9 6.3 11.6 8.7
Bachelor’s .5 .8 .8 .8 2.1
Master’s or more 1.5 1.9 1.3 4.0 3.1
bservations 5,321 1,496 1,572 37,082 31,586
nemployment rate (%) 6.1 5.0 5.7 4.8
articipation rate (%) 76.3 76.3 79.2 79.1
DP per capita (000s DKK) 197.5 201.3 219.8 225.1This content downloaded fr
ll use subject to University of Chicago Preom 145.108.136.101 on July 2
ss Terms and Conditions (http:1, 2020 02:1
//www.journNOTE.—Individual characteristics are based on authors’ own calculations; aggregate statistics are from
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A. Unemployment Duration
The aim of the activation program is to stimulate those in the treatment
group tofindwork faster. In the presence of spillovers, a simple comparison
of outcomes between treatment and control groups does not provide a
proper estimate for the effect of the activation program. To identify possible
spillover effects, we use the comparison counties, in which the activation
program was not introduced. We use the preexperiment period to control
for structural differences between counties.
We consider the effect of the program on the probability of exiting unem-
ployment within a fixed time period.4 Let Ei be an indicator for exiting un-
employment within this period. We consider exit within 3 months, 1 year,
and 2 years. So in the first case, the variable Ei takes the value 1 if individual i
is observed to leave unemployment within 3 months and 0 otherwise. To
estimate the effect of the activation program on the treatment and control
groups, we estimate the following linear probability model:
Ei 5 ari 1 xib 1 ddi 1 gci 1 hpi 1 Ui: (2)FIG. 5.—Logarithm of the stock of vacancies per month (experiment period be-
tween vertical lines); m1 5 January.4 In app. A, two other model specifications are discussed. These give similar
estimates for the effects of the activation program on the treatment and control
groups.
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This is a difference-in-differences model. Differences in the probabilities of
exiting unemployment between counties are controlled for by county fixed
effects ari , where ri describes the county in which individual i lives. The
common time trend is described by hpi , where pi is either the experiment pe-
riod or the preexperiment period. The dummy variable di is equal to 1 if in-
dividual i is in the treatment group, and ci is equal to 1 if individual i is in the
control group.5 A vector of covariates (xi) contains gender, immigrant sta-
tus, age dummies, education level, log previous earnings, history of benefit
receipt, and an indicator for becoming unemployed in November or De-
cember to capture possible differences in labor market conditions between
the end (Q4) and the beginning (Q1) of a year.
Our parameters of interest are d and g, which describe the effect of the
activation program on those in the treatment group and those in the control
group, respectively. The parameter g thus describes possible spillover ef-
fects. The key identifying assumption for the spillover effects is a common
trend in exit probabilities between the experiment counties and the compar-
ison counties. The randomized experiment identifies the difference in exit
probabilities between treatment and control groups in the experiment coun-
ties, which is d 2 g.
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the linear probability model.
Standard errors are clustered within counties interacted with the two calen-
dar time periods. First, the size of the effect on the treatment group becomes
smaller for longer unemployment durations but is always positive and highly
statistically significant. The decrease in size is not surprising. After longer pe-
riods, the fraction of survivors is reduced substantially, and the parameter es-
timates describe absolute changes in survival probabilities. Also, Graversen
and van Ours (2008), Rosholm (2008), and Vikström, Rosholm, and Svarer
(2013) find that the effect of the activation program is largest early in the un-
employment spell.
After 3 months, individuals in the treatment group are more than 9%
(0:059 1 0:033)more likely to have foundwork than individuals in the con-
trol group, but over one-third of this difference is due to reduced job find-
ing of the control group. The effect of the activation program on those ran-
domly assigned to the control group during the experiment is substantial
and significant after 3 months. During this period, the activation program
is most intense, containing a job search assistance program and frequent
meetings with caseworkers. Early in the unemployment spell, relatively
many participants in the activation program leave unemployment, which
reduces treatment externalities for the control group later in the unemploy-5 The previous program evaluations (Graversen and van Ours 2008; Rosholm
2008; Vikström, Rosholm, and Svarer 2013) showed that the program was effective
from the very start (it was found that even before any program started, the an-
nouncement letter had a positive “threat” effect on outflow).
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ment spell. Indeed, wefind that after 1 year the effect on the control group is
smaller in magnitude and has changed sign. After 2 years, the negative effect
on the control group is more than half the size of the effect on the treatment
group. Both effects are statistically significant but small. Only slightly more
than 3%of the individuals in the treatment group are still unemployed after
2 years.
B. Earnings and Hours Worked
Participation in the activation program may affect not only job finding
but also the quality of the job. We consider weekly earnings and hours
worked after unemployment. If, for example, the activation program induces
job seekers to lower their reservation wage, theymay find jobs faster but will
have lower earnings, on average.On the other hand, if the programpoints the
job seekers to the most suitable jobs, this may result in better matches and
higher earnings, on average. Similar arguments can bemade for hoursworked.
We estimate a model similar to equation (2):
Yi 5 ari 1 xib 1 ddi 1 gci 1 hpi 1 Ui,
where the outcomeYi is either the logarithm of weekly earnings of individ-
ual i or hours worked per week.6 In the set of covariates we include weekly
earnings and hours worked before becoming unemployed. The results are
presented in columns 1 and 2, respectively, of table 3. These show no effects
of the activation program on both the treatment group and the control
group.
We conclude that even though the activation program significantly re-
duces the duration until job finding for the treatment group and increasesTable 2







Treatment group .059*** (.007) .039*** (.004) .010** (.005)
Control group 2.033** (.014) .013*** (.003) 2.006** (.003)
Mean dependent variablea .500 .901 .969
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,057 77,057 77,0576 Both earnings and hours
der of the calendar year in w
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** Significant at the 5% level.
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the duration for the control group, the program has no impact on post-
unemployment earnings and hours worked.
C. Vacancies
The results in the previous subsection provide evidence for treatment ex-
ternalities. A likely channel is that unemployed job seekers compete for the
same job openings and that an increase in the search effort of participants
affects the exit rate to work of other unemployed job seekers in the same
local labor market. In addition, the increase in job search effort affects the
efficiency of the matching process (either positively or negatively). Firms
observing these changes adapt the number of vacancies, which influences
both participants and nonparticipants. In this subsection, we investigate
to what extent the stock of vacancies is affected by the experiment.7
To investigate empirically whether the experiment affects the demand for
labor, we consider the stock of vacancies in county r in month t, denoted by
Vrt. We regress the logarithm of the stock of vacancies on time dummies at
and an indicator for the experiment Drt and include county fixed effects vr,
log Vrtð Þ 5 at 1 dDrt 1 vr 1 Urt:
This is, again, a difference-in-differences model. The parameter of interest is
d, which describes the fraction bywhich the stock of vacancies changes dur-
ing the experiment. The key identifying assumption is that the experiment
counties and the comparison counties have a common trend, described by
at, in the changes in the stock of vacancies. Furthermore, the experiment
should affect only the local labormarket in the experiment counties. If there
are spillovers between counties, d would underestimate the effect of the ex-
periment on vacancy creation. Finally, since the unit of time is a month,able 3






reatment group .01 (.02) .89 (1.24)
ontrol group .01 (.02) .14 (1.22)
dividual characteristics Yes Yes
ounty fixed effects Yes Yes
bservations 68,979 68,9807 The vacancy data come from
cancies (formal and informal) is
and that the use of job centers
This content download
ll use subject to University of Chicagjob centers. We assume that
correlated with the vacancies
is not affected by the experim
ed from 145.108.136.101 on July 
o Press Terms and Conditions (httpNOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Individual characteristics include gender, age dummies, ed-
cation level, immigrant status, log previous earnings, labor market history, and quarter of entering unem-
loyment. For the hours regression (col. 2), they also include previous hours worked.the total stock of va-
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there is likely autocorrelation in the error termsUrt. Because the total num-
ber of counties equals 14, we report cluster-robust standard errors to ac-
count for the autocorrelation (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004
for an extensive discussion).
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Column 1 shows that during the
4 months of the experiment (November 2005–February 2006), the stock
of vacancies increased by about 5% in the experiment counties, but this ef-
fect is not significant. Recall that the activation program does not start im-
mediately after a worker enters unemployment and that workers start the
2-week job search assistance program 5–6 weeks after entering unemploy-
ment. Therefore, we allow the effect of the experiment to change over time.
The parameter estimates reported in column 2 show that during the experi-
ment, the stock of vacancies starts to increase in the experiment counties,
compared to other counties. This effect peaks inMay–June, 3–4months after
the end of program assignment, and decreases afterward.
Column 3 presents the same analysis as column 2 but restricts the obser-
vation period to January 2005–December 2006. The pattern in the effects of
the experiment on the stock of vacancies remains similar, although fewer pa-
rameter estimates are significant. Estimated effects are slightly smaller,
while standard errors are sometimes somewhat larger and sometimes some-
what smaller. In column 4, we find very similar results, using normalized
log vacancies as the outcome variable.8 Finally, as in the empirical analyses
on unemployment durations, we perform a robustness analysis restricting
the set of comparison counties. The estimated effects vary somewhat, de-
pending on the choice of the set of comparison counties. Overall, both the
estimated effects of the experiment and the standard errors increase some-
what (the estimation results are provided in app. B).
V. Equilibrium Analysis
The empirical results on unemployment duration, earnings, and the stock
of vacancies indicate the presence of equilibrium effects. Nonparticipants in
the experiment have somewhat reduced exit rates from unemployment, the
stock of vacancies increases after 3 months (although the magnitude of this
effect varies between specifications), and the activation program does not
affect earnings and hours worked conditional on employment. In the pres-
ence of treatment externalities, a simple comparison of outcomes between
participants and nonparticipants does not estimate the most policy-relevant
treatment effect. In particular, a large-scale rollout of the program changes
the treatment intensity in the population and thereby the effect of the acti-
vation program. In this section, we extend the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (DMP) equilibrium searchmodel (see Diamond 1982;Mortensen8 We weight the regression by using the standard deviation of log vacancies at the
county level (in the preexperiment periods).
This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance 1093
A
1982; and Pissarides 2000) to analyze how externalities vary with the treat-
ment intensity of the activation program. Themodel is estimated by indirect
inference, where we use the estimates in the previous section as the auxiliary
model, given a treatment rate of approximately 30%. We then use the esti-
mated model to study the effects of the activation program for higher treat-
ment rates, including the case where the program is implemented for all un-
employed individuals.
A. The Labor Market
Point of departure is a discrete-time DMP matching model. We extend
the model with an endogenous matching function that depends on labor
market tightness, the individual’s number of applications, and the average
number of applications (see Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman 2006 for a re-
lated matching function). We try to keep our matching model as simple
as possible, but with the restriction that it can describe the estimated treat-
ment effects well. Workers are ex ante homogeneous, they are risk neutral,
and all have the same productivity. They differ only in whether or not they
participate in the activation program. Program participation reduces the
costs of sending an application but costs time. It also affects the effectiveness
of a given application. Recall that the goal of the activation program is to
stimulate job search effort. The regular meetings do not include elements
that increase human capital or productivity (e.g., Graversen and van Ours
2008). Indeed, we do not find any effect of the activation program on job
characteristics. Firms are also assumed to be identical. Although the nature
of the experiment is temporary, we consider a labor market in steady state.
Since unemployment inflow and outflow are high in Denmark, this assump-
tion is not too restrictive. Furthermore, within our stationarymodel, we treat
the program as being permanent.9 Finally, we impose symmetry (identical
workers play identical strategies) and anonymity (firms treat identical work-
ers equally).
When a worker becomes unemployed, she receives benefits b and a value
of nonmarket time h. She must also decide how many applications to send
out. The choice variable a describes the number of applications, which
workers make simultaneously within a time period. Aworker becomes em-
ployed in the next period if one of the job applications is successful; other-
wise, she remains unemployed and must apply again in the next period.
Making job applications is costly, andwe assume these costs to be quadratic
in the number of applications, that is, g0a2. Convex search costs are conve-9 When estimating the model, we take into account that workers do not expect
program participation in the future, which reflects the temporary nature of the ex-
periment. The model used for policy simulations allows workers to take future pro-
gram participation into account.
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nient and can be motivated by the idea that workers consider the “low-
hanging fruit”first, whilefinding additional vacancies becomes increasingly
difficult.
An important feature of the model is that we allow the success of an ap-
plication to depend on the search behavior of other unemployed workers
and the number of posted vacancies. Let a describe the average number
of applications made by other unemployed workers, u the unemployment
rate, and v the vacancy rate (number of open vacancies divided by the size of
the labor force). In Section V.B, we derive our matching function and find
that it exhibits constant returns to scale. Thematching rate for aworkerwho
sends out a applications, mða; a, vÞ, is increasing in labor market tightness
v 5 v=u and decreasing in the average search intensity of other workers a.
As explained below, the matching function is different for participants and
nonparticipants in the activation program.
Let r be the discount rate and E(w) the flow value of being employed at a
job that paysw. We assume that benefits and search costs are realized at the
end of the period, to simplify notation (if one prefers benefits and search
costs to be realized at the beginning of a period, they should be multiplied
by (1 1 r)). For an unemployed worker who does not participate in the ac-







b 1 h 2 g0a2 1 m0 a; a, vð ÞE wð Þ 1 1 2 m0 a; a, vð Þð ÞU0½ ,
which can be rewritten as
rU0 5 max
a≥0
 b 1 h 2 g0a2 1 m0 a; a, vð Þ E wð Þ 2 U0ð Þ: (3)
The optimal number of applications of a worker who does not participate in
the activation program, (a*0 ) follows from the first-order condition
a*0 5
E wð Þ 2 U0
2g0
∂m0 a; a, vð Þ
∂a
ja 5 a*0 : (4)
The activation program consists of meetings with caseworkers and a job
search assistance program, which are both time-consuming for participants.
We set the value of nonmarket time at 0 for the participants and at h for the
nonparticipants (where, at this moment, we do not rule out that h < 0). The
benefit of the program is that it reduces the costs of making job applications
to g1 < g0. This implies that, for participants in the activation program, the
value of unemployment is given by
rU1 5 max
a≥0
 b 2 g1a2 1 m1 a; a, vð Þ E wð Þ 2 U1ð Þ:This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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Let a*1 denote the optimal number of applications of a participant in the ac-
tivation program that follows from
a*1 5
E wð Þ 2 U1
2g1





Furthermore, t is the fraction of the unemployed workers participating in
the activation program. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria, the average
number of applications of all unemployed workers within the population
equals a 5 ta1* 1 ð1 2 tÞa0*.
The aim of ourmodel is to describe the behavior of unemployedworkers.
Therefore, we keep the model for employed workers as simple as possible
and ignore on-the-job search. This is also motivated by data restrictions;
our data do not contain any information on job-to-job transitions. With
probability d, a job is destroyed and the employed worker becomes unem-
ployed. Under the assumption that wages are paid at the end of the period,
the value function for the state of employment at wage w is
rE wð Þ 5 w 2 d E wð Þ 2 Uð Þ: (6)
When estimating the model parameters, we take account of the temporary
nature of the experiment and replace U in equation (6) withU0.10 However,
for our policy simulations, which consider a complete and permanent role
out of the program, we use U 5 tU1 1 ð1 2 tÞU0, where t is the fraction of
workers who start participating in the activation program when they be-
come unemployed. This implies that employed workers realize that when
they are fired, there is a positive probability of receiving job search assis-
tance.
Vacancies are opened by firms at a per-period cost of cv. The probability
of filling a vacancy depends on the fraction of unemployed workers partic-
ipating in the activation programs, the application behavior of participants
and nonparticipants, and labor market tightness v. The probability of filling
a vacancy (given that the matching function exhibits constant returns to
scale) is mða*0 , a*1 ; t, vÞ=v, which we derive below. The value of a vacancy
V follows from
rV 5 2cv 1
m a*0 , a*1 ; t, v
 
v
J wð Þ 2 Vð Þ, (7)
where J(w) is the value of a filled vacancy. Each period that a job exists, the
firm receives the value of output y minus wage cost w. With probability d,10 This assumes that employed workers do not expect to participate in the acti-
vation program. Given that separations are exogenous, the more important impli-
cation is that unemployed workers know that the next time they enter unemploy-
ment, the experiment has ended.
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the job is destroyed and switches from filled to vacant. The value of a filled
vacancy J(w) is therefore given by
rJ wð Þ 5 y 2 w 2 d J wð Þ 2 Vð Þ: (8)
B. Wages and the Matching Function
Wages are determined byNash bargaining. The bargaining takes place af-
ter the worker and firm meet. Firms observe whether or not the unem-
ployed worker participates in the activation program. In the absence of re-
negotiation, participating and nonparticipating workers have different
outside options, and consequently we must allow their equilibrium wages
to differ. Let b denote the bargaining power of workers. Then, the gen-
eralized Nash bargaining outcome for a worker in participation state,
i 5 f0, 1g, implies
w*i 5 arg max
wi
  E wið Þ 2 Uið Þb J wið Þ 2 Vð Þ12b:
Equilibrium wages follow from the first-order condition:
1 2 bð Þ w*i 1 d U 2 r 1 dð ÞUi
 
5 b y 2 w*i
 
: (9)
In appendix C, we solve the model for the wage mechanism of Albrecht,
Gautier, andVroman (2006), whereworkers withmultiple offers receive the
full surplus because of Bertrand competition between the firms that made
them an offer. This gives similar results in terms of labor market flows, va-
cancy creation, and welfare effects of the activation program. The outcomes
are discussed in more detail in Section VI.C.2.
Finally, we specify the matching ratesm0ða; a, vÞ andm1ða; a, vÞ for non-
participating and participating unemployed workers, respectively, and
mða*0 , a*1 ; t, vÞ=v for vacancies. Since participation in the activation program
reduces search costs, the matching functions allow for different search in-
tensities of participants and nonparticipants. Moreover, they allow for con-
gestion effects between unemployed job seekers. We adjust the matching
function of Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006) to incorporate these fac-
tors.11 There are two coordination frictions affecting job finding: (1) work-
ers do not know where other workers apply, and (2) firms do not know
which candidates are considered by other firms.12 If a firm receives multiple
applications, it randomly selects one applicant, who receives a job offer. The
other applications are rejected. A worker who receives only one job offer
accepts the offer and matches with the firm. If a worker receives multiple
job offers, the worker randomly selects one of the offers and accepts it.11 In a sensitivity analysis, we consider a Cobb-Douglas matching function in-
stead. See Sec. VI.C.1 for details.
12 The second coordination friction is absent in a usual Cobb-Douglas matching
function.
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The expected number of applications per vacancy is given by







If the number of unemployed workers and the number of vacancies are suf-
ficiently large, then the number of applications that arrive at a specific va-
cancy is approximately a Poisson random variable with mean a=v. For a
nonparticipant in the activation program, an application results in a job of-
fer with probability 1=ð1 1 jÞ, where j is the number of competitors for that
job (which equals the number of other applications for that vacancy). This
implies that the probability that an application for a programnonparticipant
















The activation program can change the application behavior of participants.
The programmay affect the types of vacancies participants apply for, which
can change their success rate. We model this by introducing a parameter k,
which describes the fraction of vacancies for which a participant has a pos-
itive productivity. After screening its candidate, the firm learns whether the
worker is productive or not. The probability that an application of a pro-









When k < 1 and g1 < g0, the program induces participants to send out more
applications, but the success rate of an individual application is relatively
low.
Thematching probability for a programparticipant (i 5 1) and a nonpar-
ticipant (i 5 0) who makes a applications is given by
mi ai; a, vð Þ 5 1 2 1 2 wið Þai :
Once we substitute for a the optimal number of applications a*1 and a*0 , we
obtain the matching rates for, respectively, the participants and the non-
participants in the activation program.
The aggregatematching function is (with a little abuse of notation) simply
given by mða*0 , a*1 ; t, vÞ 5 tm1ða*1 ; a, vÞ 1 ð1 2 tÞm0ða*0 ; a, vÞ, and for rea-
sonable values of v it is first increasing in the number of applications per
worker and then decreasing.13 Having more applications per worker reduces13 Only for very low values of v is the matching function monotonically decreas-
ing in the number of applications.
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the first coordination problem mentioned above (vacancies are more likely
to get at least one applicant) but amplifies the second one (it is more likely
that one unemployed worker receives multiple job offers, while only one
firm can hire him).
C. Equilibrium and Welfare
In steady state, the inflow into unemployment equals the outflow from
unemployment, which gives
d 1 2 uð Þ 5 tm1 a*1 ; a, v
 
1 1 2 tð Þm0 a*0 ; a, v
  
u:
The equilibrium unemployment rate is therefore
u*5
d
d 1 tm1 a*1 ; a, v
 
1 1 2 tð Þm0 a*0 ; a, v
  : (10)
The zero-profit condition for opening vacancies, V 5 0, implies that the
flow value of a filled vacancy (paying wage w) equals
J wð Þ 5 y 2 w
r 1 d
:
Participants and nonparticipants receive different wages, and the expected
wage (for new vacancies) equals w* 5 ð1 2 tÞw*0 1 tw*1 . Since the flow
value of a filled vacancy is a linear function of the wage, we can substitute
the expected wage in this flow value and next substitute the expected flow
value in the Bellman equation for vacancies (eq. [7]). This gives




r 1 dð Þcv
y 2 w*
: (11)
The left-hand side is decreasing in v and goes to infinity when v approaches
0. Because wages are increasing in v, the right-hand side is increasing in v.
Therefore, there is a unique v* that satisfies the equilibrium condition in
equation (11). We can now define the equilibrium as the tuple {a*0 , a*1 ,
w0*,w1*, u*, v*} that satisfies equations (4), (5), (9), (10), and (11).
After solving the model and deriving conditions for equilibrium, we use
the model for policy simulations. The decision parameter for the policy
maker is the intensity of the activation program (t).14 Let cp describe the
costs of assigning an unemployed worker to the activation program. This
is a lump-sum amount paid at the start of participation in the activation pro-14 Most policy makers make a program available either to all eligible unemployed
workers or to none. This implies that t is either 1 or 0. In our policy simulations we
also consider values between 0 and 1. This provides insights into the spillover ef-
fects of the program. Cases also exist where programs have a limited budget or ca-
pacity, such that not all eligible unemployed workers can enroll.
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gram. Implicitly, we assume here that it is paid from a nondistortionary tax.
Introducing distortionary taxesmakes the program less desirable. It reduces
net earnings and thereby reduces incentives to work. Besides those costs, a
welfare analysis should take account of the productivity of the workforce
ð1 2 uÞy, the costs of keeping vacancies open vcv, and the time costs of un-
employed workers (h 2 g0a0*2) and 2 g1a1*2 for nonparticipants and par-
ticipants, respectively.15 We define welfare as net (of all pecuniary and
nonpecuniary costs) output per worker,










2 d 1 2 uð Þtcp 2 vcv:
(12)
The welfare function does not include unemployment insurance benefits
because thosemust befinanced and are thus amatter of redistribution. After
estimating the model parameters, we can investigate whether the exper-
imental treatment intensity increases welfare, that is, whether Wð0:3Þ >
Wð0Þ, and whether a large-scale rollout of the activation program increases
welfare, Wð1Þ > Wð0Þ. The latter program effect is based on the policy-
relevant treatment effect defined in equation (1). Furthermore, we can com-
pute the welfare-maximizing value for t.
Alternatively, a naive policy maker may be interested in the effect of the
program on the government budget. Since dð1 2 uÞ describes the inflow
into unemployment, total program costs are dð1 2 uÞtcp. The naive policy
maker confronts the costs of the program with a total reduction in benefit
payments. The total amount of benefit payment equals ub. This implies that
the naive policy maker chooses t such that it minimizes the costs of the un-
employment insurance program,
CUI tð Þ 5 ub 1 d 1 2 uð Þtcp: (13)
Finally, it is interesting to compare the results of these policy parameters
to results from a typical microeconometric evaluation. As discussed in Sec-
tion II.B, most microeconometric evaluations impose SUTVA and typi-
cally compare the costs of a program with the reductions in benefit pay-
ments. The reduction in benefit payments is usually estimated from
comparing expected benefit durations of participants and nonparticipants




m a*1 ; a, v
  2 1





, (14)15 See Greenberg and Robins (2008), who show the importance of taking time
costs into account when evaluating the Canadian self-sufficiency program.
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where ð1=mða*1 ; a, vÞÞ 2 ð1=ða*0 ; a, vÞÞ is the difference in expected unem-
ployment duration between unemployed workers participating and those
not participating in the activation program. A positive value implies positive
returns to the program. This evaluation ignores not only equilibrium effects
but also, for example, foregone leisure of the participants; see van den Berg
and van der Klaauw (2006).VI. Estimation and Evaluation
In this section, we first describe the estimation of the equilibrium search
model by indirect inference, using the treatment effects estimated in Sec-
tion IV as our auxiliary model (see Gourieroux,Monfort, and Renault 1993
and Smith 1993). Next, the estimated model is used to study the welfare ef-
fects of the program and the effects of a large-scale implementation. Finally,
we provide some sensitivity analyses.A. Parameter Values
Our key interest is the causal effect of modifying the intensity of the ac-
tivation program on various aggregated labor market outcomes. To avoid
making additional functional form assumptions in the estimation proce-
dure, we estimate the equilibrium model using indirect inference. This also
allows us to ignore measurement error and has the advantage that the esti-
mation is less computer intensive than alternative approaches for estimating
structural models. Furthermore, our approach estimates the structural pa-
rameters using mainly information directly related to the activation pro-
gram. Indirect inference has the additional advantage that it is transparent
about which information drives the identification of a parameter. Below,
we discuss the estimation in more detail.
By the nature of our matching function, the equilibrium search model is
in discrete time. The length of a time period is determined by the time it
takes for firms to collect and process applications, which we set to 1 month.
Next, we fix the treatment intensity of the activation program during the
experiment to 0.3 (see the discussion in Sec. II.A). We denote the treatment
intensity during the experiment by te. In Section VI.C, we investigate the
sensitivity of the results by estimating the model for alternative levels of
te. As mentioned above, the main goal of estimating the model is to learn
what the policy-relevant treatment effect (t 5 1) is in steady state. How-
ever, when we estimate the model, we must take into account that workers
realize that the program will not continue forever, and therefore we take
into account that workers expect that when they lose their job, they will en-
ter stateU0 (i.e., they receive no treatment). The discount rate is set to 10%an-
nually, which implies that r is 0.008. This is smaller than the discount rates
used by, for example, Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) and Fougère, Pradel, andThis content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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Roger (2009) and estimated by Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006). Produc-
tivity y is normalized to 1. The top panel of table 6 summarizes the values
for the model parameters that we fix a priori.
After the discount rate, the treatment intensity, and productivity are
fixed, there are eight remaining unknown parameters, which we estimate
using indirect inference. The parameters are determined such that a set of
data moments is matched as closely as possible by the corresponding model
predictions.We use nine moment restrictions, which are presented in table 5.
The model should capture (1, 2) the unemployment and vacancy rates in the
experiment counties, (3, 4) the estimated program effect on the participants
and the nonparticipants, (5) the estimated increase in vacancies due to the
experiment, (6) the average matching rate in the experiment counties, (7, 8)
the small (insignificant) wage increases for participants and nonparticipants,
and (9) the fact that unemployment benefits are approximately 65% of the
wage level. Define y 5 ðg0, g1, d, k, b, b, cv, hÞ as the vector of parameters
to be estimated. For given values of y, the model can be solved and the set
of model predictions can be computed. To obtain estimates for y, we mini-
mize the sum of squared differences between the data moments and the cor-
responding model predictions over y, where each squared difference is given
an appropriate weight based on the variance of the (estimated) data moment
(see the third column in table 5). This implies that the imprecisionwithwhich,
for example, the vacancy effect and the wage effects are estimated, is taken
into account.
The estimates for the parameters are presented in the top panel of table 6
(col. 2, baseline model). Standard errors are computed with the delta
method.16 In line with the goal of the activation program, we find that the
costs of making job applications are lower for participants than for non-
participants.17 The job destruction rate is slightly over 1% per month.
The parameter estimate k indicates that the probability that an application
results in a match is smaller for participants. Thus, program participants
send applications at a lower cost, but the applications have an approximately
8.5% lower probability of being effective (k 5 0:915). Unemployment ben-
efits are 64% of productivity, and the bargaining power of workers is 0.70.
The leisure costs of participating in the activation program are less than 4%
of productivity.16 Standard errors are computed as follows. Define the vector of data moments
(listed in table 5) as v, with covariance matrix Σ̂v. The estimates of y are a function
of the data moments: ŷ 5 f ðvÞ. The covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is
given by Σ̂ŷ 5 ð∂f ðvÞ=∂vÞΣ̂vð∂f ðvÞ=∂vÞ0:
17 Note that the relatively large standard errors for g0 and g1 are due to the fact
that levels of the application cost parameters are not very precisely identified from
the data. In particular, there are different levels that lead to almost similar fits of the
model. The ratio of the two is very precisely identified, however.
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The middle panel of table 6 presents the fit of the model by listing the
difference between the model moment and the (targeted) data moments.
The baseline model is able to reproduce the empirical findings. The effects
of the program on both participants and nonparticipants are matched per-
fectly. Also the positive effect on vacancies and the outflow probabilityTable 6













Treatment share, experiment, te .3 .3 .3
Per-period discount rate, r .008 .008 .008
Productivity, y 1 1 1
Estimated parameters:
Application cost, nonparticpants, g0 .504 (.142) .907 (.663) .033 (.005)
Application cost, participants, g1 .262 (.080) .651 (.467) .016 (.004)
Job destruction rate, d .011 (.004) .011 (.005) .011 (.003)
Share of vacancies with positive
surplus, k .915 (.040) .895 (.044)
Unemployment insurance
benefits, b .638 (.007) .650 (.205) .527 (.043)
Bargaining power, b .702 (.040) .991 (.004)
Vacancy costs, cv .981 (.119) 2.217 (1.342) 9.349 (.515)
Value nonmarket time, h .036 (.038) .023 (.155) .109 (.021)
Search intensity elasticity, x .000 (.000)
Model Fit: Deviations from Data Moments
Effect on job finding, nonparticipants 2.033 .000 .010 .008
Effect on job finding, participants .059 .000 .001 .000
Effect on vacancies (%) .047 2.004 2.025 2.004
Outflow within 3 months .51 .000 .000 .000
Effect on wage, nontreated (%) .01 2.011 2.010 2.028
Effect on wage, treated (%) .01 2.009 2.010 2.004
Unemployment (for t 5 .3) .05 .000 .000 2.001
Vacancy rate .01 .001 2.010 .002
Replacement rate .65 .000 .000 .004
Key Model Predictions
Policy-relevant treatment effecta 2.003 (.009) .004 (.006) .011 (.001)
Experimental (naive) treatment effectb .050 (.004) .045 (.334) .046 (.003)
Change in unemploymentc .001 (.002) 2.001 (.014) 2.002 (.0003)
Change in welfarec,d 2.006 (.003) 2.002 (.002) 2.013 (.002)
Change in government expenditurec .001 (.001) .0003 (.010) 2.001 (.0001)This content downloaded
ll use subject to University of Chicago P from 145.
ress Terms108.136.101 o
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b The experimental treatment effect estimate is defined as E½mða1*; a, vÞt 5 0:3 2 E½mða*0 ; a, vÞjt 5 0:3.
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within 3 months are matched perfectly. The wage effects are also close to
the data, but since the empirical wage effects are statistically insignificant
(see table 3), they receive a low weight in the estimation procedure. Finally,
the unemployment rate, vacancy rate, and replacement rate are also matched
very closely.B. Increasing the Intensity of the Activation Program
Next, we use the model to predict how the program effects depend on the
fraction t of the unemployed population participating in the activation pro-
gram. We are interested in the effects on the matching rates of both partic-
ipants and nonparticipants, as well as the effects on aggregate unemploy-
ment, market tightness, wages, and welfare.
We simulate themodel for a gradually increasing fraction of programpar-
ticipants t in the unemployed population. The results are shown in figure 6.
The graph on the top left shows that increasing the treatment rate tmono-
tonically increases the unemployment rate. The difference between no
treatment and full treatment is approximately 0.06%. The increase in unem-
ployment can be explained by thematching rates, which are presented in the
top-right graph. Because participants in the activation program send out
more applications than nonparticipants, they always have a highermatching
rate. The difference in matching rates remains stable for different values of t
and shows that participants are about 5%more likely to find a job within a
given month. The matching rates of both participants and nonparticipants
decreasemonotonically as t increases, and even the aggregate (average) match-
ing rate decreases marginally. For a program intensity of 30%, participants
have a 24% higher matching rate than nonparticipants.
The simulated matching rates can be related to the treatment effects pre-
sented in Section II.B. Results, including standard errors, can be found in
the bottom panel of table 6. The evaluation of the randomized experiment
estimates a treatment effect on the matching rates equal to 0:243 2
0:193 5 0:050, which is E½mða*1 ; a, vÞjt 5 0:3 2 E½mða*0 ; a, vÞjt 5 0:3.
However, the policy-relevant treatment effect is E½mða*1 ; a, vÞjt 5 12
E½mða*0 ; a, vÞjt 5 0, which is 20.003 and not statistically different from 0.
Even though the microeconometric evaluation suggests a positive effect on
the matching rate, the policy-relevant treatment effect is close to 0.
The higher unemployment rate, combined with more applications per
job seeker, leads to an increase in the number of vacancies. As can be seen
in themiddle-left graph infigure 6, market tightness increases in t, as vacancy
supply increasesmore than unemployment. Thewagenegotiated byprogram
participants is slightly higher than that of nonparticipants, because of their
better outside option. The difference is small, however, and both levels are
relatively constant as t increases. Furthermore, wefind that the average num-This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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ber of applications per month in the population rises from 0.65 to 0.95 as t
increases from 0 to 1 (not shown in the figure).18
The estimatedmodel allows for different types of cost-benefit analyses, as
discussed in Section V.C. Equation (12) defines welfare as a function of t,
which is plotted in the bottom-left graph of figure 6. In line with rising un-
employment, vacancies (and thus vacancies’ posting costs), and programFIG. 6.—Simulation results of the baseline model.18 The average number of applications per month is low and likely much lower
than the actual number of vacancies to which unemployed workers apply. How-
ever, in our model a describes applications for which the unemployed worker is
among the most suitable candidates and has a fair chance of receiving a job offer.
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costs, welfare decreases with rising t and is maximized for t 5 0. A large-
scale rollout of the program reduces welfare by almost 0.006, which corre-
sponds to 0.6% of workers’ productivity. The reason for the decline in wel-
fare is that the negative congestion effects of the increased search intensity
dominate. We also consider total government expenditures on unemploy-
ment benefits and the costs of the activation program (see eq. [13]). We find
that government expenditure increases in the share of the unemployedwork-
ers that participate in the activation program; see the bottom-right graph in
figure 6. A large-scale rollout of the activation program increases total gov-
ernment expenditure on the unemployment benefits program by 4%.
Microeconometric evaluations often ignore equilibrium effects. Equa-
tion (14) shows the cost-benefit analysis that is usually applied in micro-
econometric evaluations. It simply compares the costs of the program with
the difference in total benefits payments between participants and non-
participants. The costs of the program (cp) are 2,122 DKK (about $382),
while the difference in average unemployment duration is 1.1 months. Av-
erage monthly benefit payments are 14,800 DKK. The gain for the govern-
ment budget is, therefore, 14,158DKK for each participant in the activation
program. This microeconometric evaluation thus erroneously provides a
positive assessment of the activation program.
Finally, we calculate how restrictive SUTVAwould be in this application.
We do this by evaluating the welfare function while ignoring all equilibrium
effects. Specifically, we fix a*0 , a*1 , and v at their values for t 5 0. This implies
thatm0ða*0 ; a*1 , vÞ andm1ða*1 ; a*0 , vÞ also no longer vary with t. Next, we use
equation (10) to compute the unemployment rate u for different values of t,
which implicitly determines the vacancy rate v 5 vu. We can then substi-
tute all variables in the welfare function, equation (12). Figure 7A compares
predicted welfare when erroneously ignoring equilibrium effects with wel-
fare that does take them into account. The results show that when equilib-
rium effects are ignored, welfare would increase in the treatment intensity t.
The difference between the two welfare measures is shown in figure 7B,
which can be interpreted as an error measure for the violation of the SUTVA
assumption. For t 5 1, the difference is 1.6% of output, and more impor-
tantly, under SUTVA the welfare effects appear to be positive instead of neg-
ative.
Themain conclusions from the analysis above is that even thoughmatch-
ing rates of participants and nonparticipants are different, the aggregate
matching rate slightly decreases with the intensity of the activation pro-
gram. As a result, the program effects are not positive. At 0% program par-
ticipation, the unemployment rate is minimized and welfare is maximized.
The results show the importance of taking equilibrium effects into account,
and therefore the conclusions do not concur with the results from a stan-
dard microeconometric evaluation that typically ignores equilibrium ef-
fects.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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C. Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we address the robustness of our empirical results. We
focus on modeling choices in the equilibrium search model. We made three
key assumptions. First, our matching function is of the urn-ball type ratherFIG. 7.—Welfare ignoring equilibrium (eq) effects.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1108 Gautier et al.
A
than the more commonly used Cobb-Douglas type. Second, wages are de-
termined by Nash bargaining. Third, the treatment intensity during the ex-
periment (30%) is based on a steady-state assumption. Below, we discuss
alternatives to these assumptions.
1. The Matching Function
The urn-ball matching function with multiple applications and without
full recall has the property that, initially, the average matching rate is in-
creasing in average search intensity, but for sufficiently high average search
intensity a further increase in the number of applications reduces thematch-
ing rate. This captures the idea that a firm can fail to hire because it loses its
candidate to other firms. The negative welfare effects are, however, not solely
driven by congestion effects, as we show below. One way to switch them off
is by estimating the model with a Cobb-Douglas matching function. The
Cobb-Douglas function allows for different search intensities for treated
and nontreated individuals, which are optimally chosen by the job seeker.
By allowing for a distinct elasticity (x) for the aggregate search intensity,
we use an aggregate matching function that is more flexible than the one
that is commonly used in the literature. The aggregate number of monthly
matches is given by
M a, u, vð Þ 5 axuav12a, (15)
where a is the average search intensity in the population. This specification
is used because in a standard version (Mða, u, vÞ 5 ðauÞav12a), the estimate
of a converges to 0 (or to a negative value if no restriction is used in the es-
timation procedure). This is unrealistic and a clear signal that this specifica-
tion is not flexible enough to reproduce the empirical findings. To keep the
number of estimated parameters equal to the baseline model, we estimate x
and set a 5 0:74 (as was estimated for Denmark by Albaek and Hansen
1995). Results are very similar when a 5 0:5. Parameter estimates and the
fit of the model can be found in column 3 of table 6. Note that the estimate
for x equals 0, indicating that the spillover effect on nonparticipants can be
matched onlywith a nonpositive relation between search intensity and aggre-
gatematches. The fit of themodel is not as good as that of the baselinemodel.
The spillover effect on nonparticipants and the effect on vacancies are only
partially reproduced. Also, the vacancy rate is much lower than the targeted
level. The simulation results (bottompanel of table 6) show that themain pre-
dictions are quite similar to the baselinemodel’s, although standard errors are
larger. The policy-relevant treatment effect is close to 0, while the experimen-
tal (naive) estimate is positive. Unemployment decreases slightly, but the
change in welfare is still negative, and government expenditure increases
as t increases. The simulation results are summarized in figure C1. We con-
clude that the qualitative result for welfare is in line with our baseline model
but that the fit is worse.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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2. The Wage Mechanism
In the baseline model, wages are determined by Nash bargaining. In Sec-
tion V.B, ex post Bertrand competition was mentioned as an alternative
wage-setting mechanism. Below, we briefly discuss the results from Ber-
trand competition (see Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman 2006 and app. C for
more details).
Under Bertrand competition, workers with one offer receive their reser-
vation wage while workers with multiple offers receive the full match sur-
plus. This has the theoretical advantage that it endogenizes the bargaining
power, which reduces the number of parameters to estimate by one.
Parameter estimates, the fit of the model, and simulation predictions can
be found in column 4 of table 6. The simulation results are presented in fig-
ure C2. We find that, except for a higher value of nonmarket time and very
large vacancy costs, the parameter estimates are similar to the ones in the
baseline model. Standard errors are smaller, however. The fit of the model
is not as good as that of our baseline model. In particular, the program effect
on nonparticipants and the vacancy effect are less well matched. The simu-
lations predict that the policy-relevant treatment effect is positive but, again,
much smaller than the experimental (naive) treatment effect. Unemployment
decreases slightly, but welfare still decreases when t increases, as was the case
in the baseline model. Government expenditures decrease slightly. The main
conclusion, that because of spillovers the program leads to small but negative
welfare effects, continues to hold under Bertrand wages.3. Treatment Intensity
The model has been estimated under the assumption that about 30% of
the unemployed workers participate in the activation program toward the
end of the experiment period (te 5 0:3). The choice of this parameter fol-
lows from a steady-state assumption with constant inflow and a 5% job-
finding rate. Both assumptions might be violated. First, the exit rate from
unemployment shows negative duration dependence. If we take into ac-
count that the exit rate declines during the spell of unemployment, the frac-
tion of program participants among the stock of unemployed workers is re-
duced to about 26%. Furthermore, recall from Section III that the inflow
into unemployment was higher in the preexperiment year than in the exper-
iment year. If we take this decline in inflow rate into account, the intensity
of the activation program at the end of the experiment period is about 21%.
As a sensitivity check, we estimate the model using lower values of te, 0.25
and 0.2. The intuition for how this changes the results is straightforward. A
lower value of te implies that the observed negative program effects on the
nonparticipants must be the result of a smaller group of treated individuals
and thus that congestion effects must be even larger. Consequently, welfare
decreases faster.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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Heterogeneity in the pool of unemployed could also affect the value of te
in a different way. One may argue that perhaps longer-term unemployed
are unable to find a job anyway and therefore are not harmed by the higher
job-finding rate of the program participants. If one takes this argument to
the limit, the spillover effects are relevant only for the group of recently un-
employed, which is the 50% of the newly unemployed who were random-
ized out of the program. Note that this is an extreme upper bound, as it as-
sumes that the entire stock of unemployed at the start of the experiment was
unaffected by the experiment.19 The resulting value of te would be 0.5. Even
though this is an unlikely value, we present estimates based on te 5 0:5 as a
lower bound on the spillover effects.20
Taking both arguments into account, we believe that te 5 0:3 is a reason-
able value for the treatment intensity during the experiment. We present re-
sults for lower and higher values simply to demonstrate whether the conclu-
sions are sensitive to the choice of this parameter. Simulation results based
on the various values of te are presented in figure 8, together with the sim-
ulation results from the baseline model (te 5 0:3). In the figure, we plot the
unemployment rate and welfare. To make the different estimates compara-
ble, we normalize welfare to 1 in the case where no unemployed worker en-
ters the activation program. As expected, a lower value of te aggravates the
negative effect of the activation program on the unemployment rate and
welfare. For te 5 0:2, the effects on unemployment and welfare are large,
and full participation would increase unemployment by almost 1 percentage
point and decrease welfare by more than 1%. Instead, setting te 5 0:5 is
sufficient to get a modestly positive effect of the program on the unemploy-
ment rate. In this scenario, full participation reduces unemployment, but a
slightly negative effect on welfare remains (relative to the case where no
workers participate in the activation program).4. Heterogeneity, On-the-Job Search, and Steady State
Finally, we discuss some simplifying assumptions imposed in our equi-
librium search model and how these assumptions might affect the empirical
results.19 Another argument against this case is that almost everyone in our sample finds
a job within 2 years, and therefore a scenario with a zero job-finding rate for long-
term unemployed workers is unlikely.
20 One may argue that our model describes the bottom segment of the labor mar-
ket, where unemployment occurs more frequently. The unemployment rate among
low-skilled unemployed workers is twice the overall unemployment rate, and spill-
overs between labor market segments requiring different skill levels may be low.
Therefore, we also estimated our model with a twice-as-high target unemployment
rate of 10%. The results for this case are almost identical to our baseline results.
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We assumed that workers and jobs are ex ante homogeneous. Clearly,
there are differences between workers and between jobs. Allowing for
two-sided heterogeneity would complicate the analysis considerably, be-
cause sorting issues should be taken into account. Incorporating two-sidedFIG. 8.—Simulation results from estimations using different values of te.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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heterogeneity introduces other potentially interesting treatment effects. For
example, if the employment office is able to lead workers to those jobs
where their marginal productivity is highest, better matches can be created.
In that case, wages of the workers in the treatment group should be higher.
However, as shown in Section IV.B, there is no evidence for an effect on
wages. Therefore, it suffices for our application to restrict ourselves to ex
ante homogeneous workers. Moreover, the estimate k is less than 1, which
suggests that the success rate of the extra applications made by the partici-
pants is relatively low. This goes against the idea that the activation program
improves the quality of job applications or helps participants to select more
suitable vacancies.
Another abstraction of our model is that we do not allow for on-the-job
search. Allowing for on-the-job search increases the pool of job searchers,
and since only unemployed workers can receive treatment, it reduces the
fraction of treated workers (te) in the total pool of searchers. In Section
VI.C.3, we replicated our analysis for different values of te, and we found
that reducing te implies that workers impose larger negative spillovers on
other workers. This is necessary to explain the observed differences in
job-finding rates between workers in experiment and nonexperiment coun-
ties. So, if anything, allowing for on-the-job searchmakes implementing the
program economy-wide less desirable.
Finally, we assume that the labor market is in steady state, while the data
from the experiment do not represent a steady state. In particular, the share
of program participants in the pool of unemployed job searchers increases
during the experiment period and decreases again afterward. The extent to
which this discrepancy matters depends on how quickly the labor market
moves toward a steady state. As stated in Section III, themedian unemploy-
ment duration during the experimental periodwas about 15weeks, which is
much shorter than that in most other European countries and only a few
weeks longer than that in the United States. This is because unemployment
inflow and outflow rates are high and, in that case, the half-life of a deviation
from steady-state unemployment is short, see Shimer (2012) and Elsby,Mi-
chaels, and Solon (2009). Therefore, the steady-state assumption not very
restrictive for this application.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the existence and magnitude of equilibrium
effects of an activation program for unemployed workers. Combining data
from a randomized experiment in twoDanish counties with data fromother
counties, we are able to estimate the program effect not only on the partic-
ipants but also on the nonparticipating individuals. We consider various
outcomes. In particular, we find that the activation program increases the
job-finding rate of participants but has adverse effects on the job-finding
rate of the nonparticipants. This implies that simply comparing unemploy-This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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ment durations of participants and nonparticipants overestimates the effects
of the activation program. We found no impact of the program on post-
unemployment wages of participants, nor do we find evidence of spillovers
in terms of post-unemployment wages. Finally, we provide some evidence
that the activation program increased the number of vacancies in the exper-
imental counties.
These empirical findings are used to estimate an equilibrium search model.
Despite its simplicity, the model is able to replicate the empirical findings
closely, especially when an urn-ball matching function is used rather than a
Cobb-Douglas matching function. The structural parameters are estimated
through indirect inference. The model allows for simulation of scenarios in
which the number of participants in the activation program increases up to
a large-scale rollout. This provides the policy-relevant treatment effect of
the activation program.
The simulation experiments show that, despite the increased job-finding
rate for program participants and the increase in vacancies, the unemploy-
ment rate increases if the number of program participants is increased.
Congestion effects in the labor market play an important role. A large-scale
rollout of the activation program reduces welfare, not only because the un-
employment rate increases and government expenditure on the activation
program increases but also because of increased search costs of unemployed
job seekers. These results are robust against alternative specifications of the
equilibrium search model. The findings do not concur with the results from
a standard microeconometric evaluation and emphasize the importance of
considering spillover effects when evaluating labor market programs.
Our setting is one in which intensive job search assistance is offered on
top of basic assistance. Our results do not imply that all active labor market
programs, which aim at increasing job search effort, are welfare reducing. In
particular, when job search effort is low or when the program improves the
match quality, the welfare effects can be positive.Appendix A
Alternative Models for Unemployment Duration
In this appendix, we consider two alternative models to estimate the ef-
fects of the activation program on participants and nonparticipants.
A1. Log Duration Model
A disadvantage of the linear probability model is that it uses only part of
the available information on unemployment duration. Therefore, we esti-
mate a linear model using the log of unemployment duration as the depen-
dent variable. We use a difference-in-differences specification similar to
equation (2):This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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log Tið Þ 5 ari 1 xib 1 ddi 1 gci 1 hpi 1 Ui: (A1)
A problemwith this approach is that it cannot deal with censoring.How-
ever, because censoring occurs after 2 years, only 3%of the observations are
censored. Estimation results are presented in column 1 of tableA1 and are in
line with the results in table 2. The activation program reduces the unem-
ployment duration of participants by approximately 14%, while the unem-
ployment duration of nonparticipants increases by approximately 7%.
Both effects are significant at the 1% level.
A2. Duration Model
Previous studies used duration models to evaluate the experiment
(Graversen and van Ours 2008; Rosholm 2008). Therefore, we also specify
a proportional hazard model for the exit rate from unemployment. The exit
rate at duration t (measured in weeks) is described by v(t) and has the fol-
lowing specification:
v tjpi, ri, xi, di, cið Þ 5 lpi tð Þ exp ari 1 xib 1 ddi 1 gcið Þ, (A2)
where lpiðtÞ describes duration dependence, which is allowed to differ be-
tween individuals who enter unemployment in the experiment period and
those who enter in the preexperiment period. This difference captures the
common time trend. All other notation is the same as in the previous mod-
els.
To estimate the parameters of interest, we use stratified partial likelihood
estimation (e.g., Ridder and Tunalı 1999).21 The key advantage is that this
does not require any functional form restriction on the duration depen-
dence pattern lpiðtÞ. Let ti describe the observed duration of unemployment
of individual i 5 1, ::: , n, and the indicator variable ei takes the value 1 if an
exit from unemployment was observed and 0 if the observation has been







exp ari 1 xib 1 ddi 1 gcið Þ
o
j∈I t
 I tj ≥ ti
 






The set I p includes all individuals who entered unemployment in the same
calendar time period (experiment or preexperiment) and therefore share the21 We tried estimating the model parameters by usingMarkov chainMonte Carlo
methods allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. Since there is not much dispersion
in unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated treatment effects are very similar. Only
because standard errors are much smaller than in the Cox model are the treatment
effects on both the treated and the nontreated highly significant.
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same duration dependence pattern. A Hausman test rejects that the pattern
of duration dependence is the same in both time periods (p-value < .01). This
coincides with the earlier discussion that labor market conditions were rel-
atively favorable at themoment of the experiment. It stresses the importance
of allowing for calendar time effects in the hazard rate.
Column 2 of table A1 shows the estimates using all information on unem-
ployment durations in the data. Participating in the activation program
increases the exit rate from unemployment by 100% ðexpð0:154Þ 2 1Þ ≈
17%, compared to not having any activation program. The effect is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. The effect of the presence of the activation program
on the exit rate of the nonparticipants in the program is negative but not
significant.
The results in Section IV.A show that most effects of the activation pro-
gram occur in the first months of the program. This is in line with Rosholm
(2008). The proportional hazard model assumes that the effect of the activa-
tion program on the exit rate remains constant during the period of unem-
ployment. As a result, the estimated effect of the program is an average over
the observation period of 2 years. Our previous results suggest that the pro-
gram effect might be larger early in the spell of unemployment. Therefore,
we estimate the same proportional hazardmodel but censor unemployment
spells after either 1 year or 3 months. Results are shown in columns 3 and 4
of table A1. Censoring the data after 1 year has little effect on the results; the
estimated effects are close to those in column 2. When we censor the spells
after 3 months, the negative effect of the program on nonparticipants is
much larger in magnitude and significant at the 1% level (see col. 4). The
coefficient corresponds to an 11% decrease in the exit rate during the first
3 months of unemployment for the nonparticipants. The effect for the par-
ticipants remains similar to that with both other specifications.
Our estimate for the difference in exit rates between participants and
nonparticipants in the activation program is in line with what has been
found before, for example, byGraversen and vanOurs (2008) andRosholm
(2008). The activation program is effective in stimulating participants to
leave unemployment, but there is some evidence that the program is asso-
ciated with negative externalities to the nonparticipants. A simple compar-
ison of the participants and nonparticipants overestimates the effectiveness
of the activation program.2222 In theory, we can allow the treatment effects d and g to depend on the treat-
ment intensity t. This is possible because workers enter unemployment at different
moments in the experiment period and the treatment intensity (the share of treated
in the stock of unemployed) changes over calendar time. However, this provides
estimates that are imprecise and also not robust to different specifications.
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In our specification we allow the duration dependence pattern to be dif-
ferent in the two calendar time periods, and we include fixed effects for all
counties. Alternatively, we can includefixed effects for the calender time pe-
riod and have the duration dependence pattern differ between counties. Re-
peating the analyses above shows that the estimated effects of the activation
program are not sensitive to the choice of the specification. We also try re-
stricting the group of comparison counties. We include only counties lo-
cated close to the experiment counties or located as far away as possible
or counties that are most similar in aggregate labor market characteristics.
The estimation results are very robust to the choice of comparison counties
and can be found in appendix B.Table A1
Estimated Effects of the Activation Program on Exit Rates of Participants
and NonparticipantsTh
ll use subject to URegression on Logis content downloaded fro
niversity of Chicago PressDuration Model: Data Censored afterUnemployment
(1)2 Years
(2)m 145.108.136.10
 Terms and Cond1 Year
(3)1 on July 21, 2020
itions (http://www3 Months
(4)Participants 2.14*** (.02) .154*** (.031) .167*** (.032) .151*** (.042)
Nonparticipants .07*** (.02) 2.044 (.030) 2.031 (.031) 2.115*** (.044)
Individual
characteristics Yes Yes Yes YesCounty fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 77,057 77,057 77,057 77,057NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Individual characteristics include gender, age dummies, ed-
ucation level, log previous earnings, immigrant status, labor market history, and quarter of entering unem-
ployment. All estimates are coefficients.
*** Significant at the 1% level.Appendix B
Empirical Analyses with Restricted Comparison Counties
In Section IV, we presented our empirical results, which are based on
comparing the experiment counties with all other Danish counties. Both
the preexperiment period and the experiment period are characterized by
solid economic growth and decreasing unemployment rates. There is no
reason to believe that (one of) the experiment counties experienced an idi-
osyncratic shock that might have affected labor market outcomes. In this
appendix, we consider the robustness of our empirical results with respect
to the choice of comparison counties.
First, we consider as comparison counties the three counties that are clos-
est to the experiment counties. These counties might bemost similar and ex-
perience a trend very close to that of the experiment counties. However, if
there are spillovers between counties due to, for example, workers commut- 02:14:10 AM
.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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ing between counties, this most likely affects neighboring counties most.
Therefore, as a second sensitivity analysis we consider the two counties that
are farthest from the experiment counties as control counties. Finally, we
consider as control counties five counties that are most similar in aggregate
statistics to the experiment counties.
Table B1 shows, for the duration model for unemployment, the estima-
tion results for the three sensitivity analyses. Comparing the parameter es-
timates across the different columns and with those presented in table A1
shows that the estimated effects are quite robust against the choice of the
comparison counties.
In table B2, we repeat the sensitivity analyses but now for the difference-
in-differences model for the stock of vacancies. Although the significance
levels differ between the different choices of comparison counties, all results
indicate substantial equilibrium effects quantitatively similar to those pre-
sented in table 4.Table B1
Estimated Effects of the Activation Program on Outcomes of Participants










Exit within 3 months:
Participants .072*** (.008) .078*** (.010) .073*** (.007)
Nonparticipants 2.021 (.014) 2.015 (.016) 2.029 (.014)
Log duration:
Participants 2.198*** (.019) 2.155*** (.019) 2.156*** (.022)
Nonparticipants .004 (.022) .046* (.020) .047* (.025)
PH censored at 3 months:
Participants .208*** (.046) .205*** (.047) .189*** (.043)
Nonparticipants 2.061 (.048) 2.066 (.049) 2.079* (.045)
Log earnings:
Participants .020 (.025) 2.005 (.024) .009 (.023)
Nonparticipants .020 (.025) 2.007 (.024) .009 (.023)
Hours worked:
Participants 1.002 (1.203) .364 (1.286) .531 (1.271)
Nonparticipants .776 (1.191) .216 (1.275) .387 (1.258)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,394 25,530 53,682This content downlo
ll use subject to University of Chicaded from 145.108.1
ago Press Terms and C36.101 on July 21, 20
onditions (http://wwNOTE.—Standard errors (clustered by county interacted with time period) are in parentheses. The closest
counties are West Zealand, Ribe, and Funen; the farthest counties are Viborg and North Jutland; and the
most similar counties are Funen, West Zealand, North Jutland, Viborg, and Aarhus. Individual character-
istics include gender, age dummies, education level, immigrant status, log previous earnings, labor market
history, and quarter of entering unemployment. PH 5 proportional hazard.
* Significant at the 10% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.20 02:14:10 AM
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Table B2











Experiment Nov–Dec 2005 .092 (.094) .039 (.168) .039 (.098)
Experiment Jan–Feb 2006 .127*** (.023) .025 (.144) .089 (.060)
Experiment Mar–Apr 2006 .146** (.035) .014 (.074) .106* (.049)
Experiment May–Jun 2006 .158* (.068) .088 (.053) .120* (.049)
Experiment Jul–Aug 2006 .079 (.069) .185** (.033) .095* (.046)
Experiment Sep–Oct 2006 .009 (.108) 2.043 (.040) 2.066 (.038)
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observation period Jan 2004–Dec 2007 Jan 2004–Dec 2007 Jan 2004–Dec 2007This content do
ll use subject to University of wnloaded from 145.10
Chicago Press Terms an8.136.101 on July 21, 2
d Conditions (http://wNOTE.—Standard errors (clustered by county) are in parentheses. The closest counties are West Zealand,
Ribe, and Funen; the farthest counties are Viborg and North Jutland; and the most similar counties are
Funen, West Zealand, North Jutland, Viborg, and Aarhus.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.Appendix C
Equilibrium Search Model with Bertrand Competition
In this appendix, we followAlbrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006) and as-
sume that wages are determined by ex post Bertrand competition rather than
Nash bargaining. Bertrand competition implies that if a worker receives of-
fers from multiple firms, wages are driven up to productivity (w 5 y). But
if a worker receives only one offer, the firm receives the full surplus. In this
latter case, the worker receives the reservationwage (w 5 wl). Therefore, the
wage depends on the number of offers (denoted by j), and the probability of
receiving the low reservation wage, given a match, is
pl að Þ ; Pr j 5 1jj > 0ð Þ 5 Pr j 5 1ð ÞPr j > 0ð Þ :
Recall, from Section V.B, that the probability that an application results
in a job offer equals w 5 ðkv=aÞð1 2 expð2a=kvÞÞ, with k 5 1 for the non-
participants. In a large labor market, the number of job offers when making
a applications follows a Poisson distribution with intensity wa. This implies
that
pl að Þ 5 wa exp 2wað Þ1 2 exp 2wað Þ 5 1 2 ph að Þ,
where ph(a) is the probability of receiving the high wage.
In the model with Nash bargaining, there are two wage levels (one for
program participants and one for nonparticipants). In case of Bertrand com-020 02:14:10 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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petition, each of these types can have a low wage or be employed at w 5 p,
and thus there are three wage levels in the population:
rEi,l wi,lð Þ 5 wi,l 2 d Ei,l 2 Uð Þ,
rEh 5 y 2 d Eh 2 Uð Þ,
where i 5 0 for nonparticipants and i 5 1 for participants. Note that Eh
lacks a subscript i, as both types of workers will receive w 5 y in case of
multiple offers.23 For an unemployed worker who is in treatment state i
and sends out a applications, the expected value of employment equals
Ei 5 pi,l aið ÞEi,l 1 pi,h aið ÞEh,








 b 2 h 1 g1a2 1 m a; a, vð Þ E1 2 U1ð Þ: (C2)
Since participants and nonparticipants in the activation program make
different numbers of applications, respectively denoted a*1 and a0*, they will
also have different reservation wages.
Bertrand competition for workers implies that if a worker has only one




wi,l 5 r 1 dð ÞUi 2 d U:
The value functions for a filled job (eq. [8]) now become
rJ wi,lð Þ 5 y 2 wi,l 2 d J wi,lð Þ 2 Vð Þ,
rJ yð Þ 5 0,
J 5 1 2 tð Þp0,l a0ð ÞJ w0,lð Þ 1 tp1,l a1ð ÞJ w1,lð Þ 1 ph J yð Þ:23 When estimating the parameters of the model, we use a slightly different spec-
ification where an employed worker expects U0 rather than U when being fired.
This reflects the temporary nature of the experiment. In the simulations, the pro-
gram is assumed to be offered permanently, and thus workers expect U when fired.
The same distinction is made in the baseline model.
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his last equation gives the expected value of a filled vacancy, where ph
escribes the average probability in the population (pl 5 ð1 2 tÞp0,lða*0 Þ1
p1,lða*1 Þ).FIG. C1.—Simulation results: model with Cobb-Douglas matching function.This content downloaded from 145.108.136.101 on July 21, 2020 02:14:10 AM
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FIG. C2.—Simulation results with Bertrand wages.
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